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nl THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

'.fILFORD ;, . HANSEi and VAfJA J.
i!A:,SEN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/ Appellants,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Suprane Court No. 19393

vs.
JOHH J. STEWART and ALICE E.K.
STEWART, husband and wife,
Defendants/Respondents

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action is to determine the rights of the parties to a strip of
property bounded on the north by and east-west line 620 feet south of
the north fence line of Respondents' pasture and bounded on the south by
an existing fence, claimed by Respondents to be their southern boundary
(see map attached to Appellants Brief)
terrred a

quiet

title action.

The action was

However,

originally

Appellants concede that the

action might more properly be termed one in ejectment.
Respondents stipulated prior to trial that they have no claim to
the disputed property through boundary by agreement or acquiescence,
adverse possession, or prescriptive easanent and have acquired no title
thereto except under their deed from Albern Allen, a ccmron grantor of
Appellants' and Respondents' properties.
The

single

issue

for

trial was

the original

location of

the

:-lortheast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34, Providence Survey of Farms.
Respondents claimed shortly before trial that their surveyor, Randy
Bott, by recent survey, had determined that the dortheast corner of Lot
12, Block 34 Providence Survey of Farms relied upon by Appellants and
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others was 33 feet north of its origi11:il loc3tion ,mJ tlul ,\ppdl:mts
were as a matter of lciw (see Exhibit .j) requireJ to move their conier

Le>

a point 33 feet south which ResponJents believed woulJ entitle them to
possession of the disputed ground.
DISPOSITIOl< U LOWER COURT

Respondents were granted a jury trial over Appellants' objections.
The jury found in favor of Respondents.

Appellants moved for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.
denied.

Appellants'

~lotion

was

Appellants now appeal both the Judgment of the District Ccurt

and the denial of their M:Jtion.
RELIEF SOUQIT OU APPEAL

Appellants respectfully request that the Judgment entered in favor
of Respondents be vacated, and that judgment be entered in favor pf
Appellants or that a new trial be granted.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

1.

The facts relevant to a determination of the location of the

:'ortheast Ccrner of Lot 12, Block 34 Providence Survey of Fanns are not
in dispute

(see Appellants'

Brief,

Surrrna.ry of Evidence,

p.

2-7 anJ

compare with Defendants' Brief, Statement of Facts, p. 2-3).
2.

Respondents' measurements to known points on the ground do not

differ significantly from those presented by Appellants.

3.

The location points for the Scutheast corner of Lot 12, Bleck

34 and the N::lrtheast corner of Lot 17, Block .'J (see map attached to
Appellants'

Brief) are agreed upon and the distance between them

agreed to be 2733 feet.
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i ·;

4.

The distdnces and descriptions set forth in the various deeds

.ffe not disputed.
5.

The existence and location of various fences are accepted.

6.

The existence and location of the present lines of possession

are not disputed (except for a single Hansen/Stewart bOt.ll'ldary).

7.

The purpose of the various plats sul:mitted was agreed upon.

8.

All surveyors agree that there is no original m:murnent at the

location of the :'ortheast O::>rner of L:lt 12, Block 34, Providence Survey
of Farms.
9.

All parties agree that,

in spite of the representation of a

4-rod rod on some of the lll10fficial plats of the area, only a 33-foot
gravel lane has ever been established on the grolll1d.

10.

All survevors agree that all of the deeds in the area will

require reforrm.tion in the event Respondents prevail (T. V. II, pp. 38- 39,
p. 139) .

11.

All parties agree that the )lortheast corner of L:lt 12, Block

34, Providence Survey of Farms as relied upon by the deed writers and as
actually possessed is at the location claimed by Appellants.
ARGUMENTS

Appellants submit the following argunents in reply to the pcints
raised in Respondents' Brief.
The

location

of

the

i'ortheast

O::>rner

of

L:lt

12,

Block

34,

Providence Fam Survey was the single issue to be detemined at trial.
If the above phrase means "the location of the Northeast Corner of
1.Dt

12,

Block 34,

Providence Fam Survey as intended by the camx:m

grantor of the parties and as used as the beginning point in Appellants'
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deeds"

then

the matter

is

easily resolved in favor of AppelL11ts.

Respondents do not dispute, and in fact

t!-teir evidence supports

the

contention that the corner as possessed and relied on is and has ahJays
been at the location Appellants claim (T.V.11,p.123-129).

Respondents

merely claim that the corner was relied upon by mistake since it was
first established.

If the above phrase means "the location of the e<ortheast Corner of
Lot 12, Block 34, Providence Farm Survey as intended by the original
surveyor" which being once established is a point on the earth which
cannot be moved as a

matter of

law,

the

trial

court

should have

determined whether the corner was
(a)

an existent corner

(b)

an obliterated corner

(c)

a lost corner.

])Jrsey v. Ryan, Ill.App. 442 N.E.2d 639 (1982) citing the Bureau of

L~1d

Mmagement' s manual of Instructions for the Survey of the Public hmds
of the United States:
(W)e think that the authorities differentiate
between three types of corners, tw:i of which llB.Y be
relied upon to ascertain a lost corner.
In the
rmnual previously referred to, three different types
of corners are noted and defined.
An existent corner is one whose position can be
identified by verifying the evidence of the roonument
or its accessories, by reference to the description
in the field notes, or located by an acceptable
supplemental survey record, some physical evidence,
or testiroony.

San Juan County v. Ayer, 604 P.2d 1304 (Wash.App., 1930) citing the
M'l.nual of Instructions for the Survey of the Public lands of the
States-1973,

Sections 5-9 at p .130 (1973 :·Janual):
6

L~1ited

,\J1 obliterated comer is one at whose point there

<1n: 110 rermining traces of the monument or its
dCcessories,
but
whose
location
has
been
perpetlldted, or the point for which may be recovered
bevond reasonable doubt by the acts and testimony of
the interested landowners, competent surveyors, or
other qualified local authorities, or witnesses, or
by some acceptable record evidence.

A lost corner is a point of a survey whose position
cannot be detennined, beyond reasonable doubt,
either from traces of the ongJ.nal markS or from
acceptable evidence or testimony that bears upon the
original position, and whose location can be
restored only be reference to one or m:ire
interdependent (i.e., nearby, adjacent) corners.
Manual Section 5-20 at 133.
A proportionate measunment is :me that gives equal

relative weight to all parts of the line.
The
excess or deficiency between t'Ml existent comers is
so distributed that the am:iunt given to each
interval bears the same proportion to the whole
difference as the record length of the interval
bears to the whole record distance. :13.nual Section
5-24 at 133.
(see also wrsev v.
(1982) supra.)

2.yan,

Ill. App.

442 :J.E. 2d 639

All parties agree that there is no survey monument at the corner.
The corner is therefore by definition either an obliterated corner or a
lost corner

(~lanual

of Surveying Instructions - 1973, p. 129 ff).

If the comer is obliterated then its location nrust have been
perpetuated by "best evidence" beyond a reasonable doubt.

Henrie v.

Hyer, 70 P.2d 154, 156 (Utah 1937) quoting from the General I.and Office
pamphlet 1909 on Restoration of Lost or Obliterated Corners, etc. p.5:
An obliterated corner is one where no visible
evidence rermins of the work of the original
surveyor in establishing it.
Its location may,
however, have been preserved beyond all question by
acts of land owners, and by the marory of those who
knew and recollect the true situs of the original
ITDnun-ent. In such case it is not a lost comer.
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Dorsey v. Ryan, (supra.)
The direction in (Irvin v. Rotramel, 68 Ill. 11,
(1873)) to establish lost con;ers ov reference to
known govenirnent corners requires, ·at a minimum,
reference to an obliterated con1er which is one
whose location mav be recovered bevond a reasonable
doubt by the testim:::my of landowne"rs, witnesses, or
acceptable record evidence.
Henrie v. Hyer, (supra.)
It is conceded, as it must be, that the original
corners as established by the government surveyors,
if they can be found, or the places where they were
originally established, if that can be definitely
determined, are conclusive on all persons owning or
clah-nirlg to hold with reference to such survey and
the roonuments placed by the original surveyor
without regard to whether they were correctly
located or not. Surveyors, in making resurveys or
in searching for or relocating or re-establishing
lost or obliterated corners, may consider extrinsic
and material evidence, as well as the tield notes,
if there is doubt or uncertaintv in the field notes,
for the purpose of determining the exact location of
lost lines or corners of the original survey.
~lonuments control over courses and distances.
Washington Rock Co. v. Young, 2 9 Utah, 108 , 80 P.
382, 110 Am.St.Rep. 666.
Staff v. Bilder, 415 P.2d 650 (Wash 1966) citing Stewart v. Hoffman, 61"
Wash.2d 37, 390 P 2d 553 (1964) and 11 C.J.S.

Boundaries Section 49c

(1938) •
Courts should ascertain and carry out the intention
of the original platters. ln_~-~se of discrepancy.
however, between lines actually marked or surveyed
on the ground and lines called for by plats, maps or
field notes, the lines marked by s1irvey on the
ground prevail save for intervening equities arising
by contract, conveyance, estoppel, prescription, or
the application of well-defined legal and equitable
concepts.
(see also Clark, Surveying and Boundaries Section
258 (3rd ed. 1959)).
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Washington .lickel C!ining & Alloys, Inc. v. 11artin, 534 P.2d 59 (Wash.
App. 1975) citing Inrmn v. Pearson, 47 Hash. 402, 92 P. 279:
But it does not follow that, if there be evidence of
a corner which has been destroyed or obliterated by
the lapse of time, a court will direct the
establishment of a corner under the rule stated, or
any other rule,
for the law establishes an
obliterated corner where the surveyor actually
located it, and not where it ought to be located by
a correct survey.
In the event a survey using the "obliterated corner"
as the point of beginning fails to resolve the
dispute between the parties, then the parties may
seek a detennination of the location of the disputed
bcundary line in a future action.

If the corner is not located bevond a reasonable doubt , it is a
lost

corner

and rrust

be reestablished by proportionate measurement

C:·l3.nual of Surveying Instructions-1973, p. 133, supra.)

Henrie v. Hyer,

supra.
A lost corner is one whose position cannot be
determined beyond reasonable doubt, either from
original marks or reliable external evidence.
Resort should be had, first, to the monuments placed
at the various corners when the original government
survey of the land was made, provided they are still
in existence and can be identified, or can be
relocated by the aid of any attainable data. But if
this cannot be done and a survey becanes necessary,
this rrust be made from the east, and not fran the
west, bcundary line of the township (113.son v.
Braught, 33 S.D. 559, 146 N.W. 687, 688.)
The Utah Supreme Court in Cornia v. Putnam, 489 P. 2d 1001 (Utah
1971). stated:
In the relocation or re-establishnent of government
corners
there is a distinction drawn between an
obliter~ted corner and a lost corner;
in the
fonrer
the investi"'ation is directed toward the
determination of its ~riginal location; while in the
latter, the corner is relocated by a new survey ...
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A lost comer is one which c::umot be replaced bv
reference to any existing data or sources of
inforrmtion, although it is not necessary that
evidence of its physical location may be seen or
that one who has seen the marked corner be produced.
A comer will not be regarded as lost where it may
be located by field notes referring to discoverable
natural objects (Chandler v. Hibberd, 165 011.App.:Zd
39, 332 P.2d 133, 141 (1958)).
In Reid V. Dunn, 201 011.App.2d 612, 20 011.Rptr.
273, 275 (1962) the Court observed that if there be
some acce table evidence of the ori inal location,
that osition will be
o
ill pre erence to the
rule that would be app ie to a ost comer.
The
Court stated:

"(I)f monuments are obliterated and undiscoverable,
comers should be re-established wherever possible
in accordance with natural objects described in the
field notes of the original survey.
And the
proportional method must not be resorted to l.lllless
the line cannot be retraced and its comers
relocated by reference to natural objects of the
field notes and all other prescribed :nethods fail."
(see also \vashington Jickel Mining & Alloys, Inc. v.
supra citing Martin v. :~eeley, 55 Wash. 2d
~222-23, 347 P.2d 529, 530 (1959).)
~13.rin,

Dorsey v. Ryan, supra.
All lost section and quarter-section comers on the
township bo=dary lines will be restored by single
ro ortionate measurE!Ilent
between
the
nearest
identirie corners on op site si es o t e missu1°
corner, north and south on a meri ional line or east
and west on a latitudinal line.
United States v. Citko,

517 F.Supp. 233 (1931)

For a corner to be lost it "must be so completely
lost that (it) cannot be replaced by reference to
any existing data or other sources of inforrmtion."
(cites omitted.) The decision that a comer is lost
should not be made l.llltil everv means has been
exercised that might aid in iJentifving its true
original position. (cite omitted). Even though the
physical evidence of a corner may have entirely
disappeared, a comer cannot be regarded as lost if
its position can be recovered through the testim:Jny
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of one or more witnesses who have a dependable
knowledge of the original location.
Appellants
reasonable

presented

doubt

that

the

evidence

at

i'lortheast

trial

to

establish beyond a

Corner

of

l.Dt

12,

Block

34

Providence Fann Survey is located at the point frequently referred to as
the "L3.rsen Fence Corner".

'This they accomplished by the unrefuted

evidence regarding old fences erected along the lines of possession of
various lot owners, record titles, measurements between known points,
unofficial plats,

an aerial photo,

and the testimony of experts in

survey law, according to the procedures set forth in the M3.nual of
Surveying Instructions - 1973, supra.
Respondents did not refute Appellants' evidence, but merely added
some measurements derived from the scaled dimensions of the Martineau
Plat.

Respondents

then disputed the

interpretation of the evidence.

legal

significance

and

legal

Respondents claim that their evidence

is legally sufficient to establish the corner as they claim in spite of
not

following

Instructions -

the procedures
1973.

set

forth in the MIDual of Surveying

Appellants claim that Respondents

present no

evidence which either legally or sufficiently supports their position,
even if viewed in the light most favorable to their case.

Respondents'

interpretation of their own evidence fails to establish anything except
some non-probative distances on t::he ground which do not conclusively
establish their claim or refute Appellants' claim beyond a reasonable
doubt.
\men the facts of this case are interpreted according to survey
law, reasonable minds cannot differ as to the outcome of this case.
There is no factual dispute to be determined by a jury.
11

Even if the Appellants'

eviJence,

as vieweJ in the

favorable to Respondents' case. were ruled

l'Ol

Jighl

imst

to es ta bl i sh L1'e cun•er

beyond a reasonable doubt and the con1er were thus ruled to be lost
rather than obliterated, Appellants should still prevail because their
surveyor has already gone through the procedures for restoring a lost
corner as set forth in the !13.nual of Surveying Instructions - 1973 p.

133, ie. through single proportionate measurement.

Respondents have not

even attempted such a restoration.
Appellants now discuss general Arguments and will later reply to
Respondents' Brief point by point.
Argurrent 1.

What evidence is necessary and how it is to be used to

establish the position of a disputed corner beyond a reasonable doubt is
a matter of law,

established over many years,

after '11UCh practical

experience, and docl.llilented in numerous cases (see Henrie v. Hyer , supra .
Cornia v

Putnam, supra, San Juan v. Ayer, supra, Dorsev v. R'.'an. supra.

United States
v. Horner,

v.

infra,

Citko ,
etc.)

supra,

Palmer

v.

Fitzpatrick,

The cases refer to the

~lanual

infra,

Hook

of Surveying

Instructions, based in part on 43 U.S.C. Sections 751, 752, and 753, and
published by the L'. S.
primary

source

of

Deparonent of the Interior,

lawful

survey

procedure.

and use it as a

Chapter

V

entitled

"Restoration of Lost or Obliterated Corners" and the pamphlets based
thereon

are

1.Jashington,

especially

applicable

Idaho, Illinois and

~bntana

to

the

present

Utah,

all, as a matter of law, require

surveyors to follow the procedures outlined in the '·lanual.
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case.

&lrbizon of Utah, Inc. v. General Oil Company, 471 P.2d 148 (Utah
1970)

citing Vaught v.

McClyroond

144 P. 2d 612

(Mont

1945)

U.S.C.A. Sections 751, 752, and 753:
When lands are granted according to an official plat
of a survey, the plat itself, with all its notes,
lines, descriptions and landmrrks, becomes as l!IlJCh a
part of the grant or deed by which they are
conveyed, and controls so far as limits are
concerned, as if such descriptive features were
written out on the fact of the deed or grant
itself ...
Congress has provided a system for the survey of
public lands, and the boundaries and limits of the
several sections and subdivisions thereof, including
quarter sections , must be ascertained in conformity
with the principles laid down in the federal
statutes ...
To find the corrm::m corner or quarter sections or the
legal center of a section of land, straight lines
must be run from the quarter section corners on the
boundary of the section to the opposite quarter
comers, the point of intersection constituting the
legal center, and the boundary line between two
quarters cannot be legally established by measuring
along one side of the section 160 rods, ...
But the government surveys are, as a matter of law,
the best evidence; and, if the boundaries of land
are clearly established thereby, other evidence is
superfluous and may be excluded; the best evidence
is the corners actually fixed upon the ground bt the
government surveyor, in defaUlt of Which the ield
notes and plats come next, unless satisfactory
evidence is produced that the corner was actually
located upon the ground at a point different from
that stated in the field notes ...
Any section corner or quarter corner that is
identified as having been established by an official
survey of the United States government must stand as
being correctly located, however plain it rray appear
that the location is wrong; because the government
surveys cannot be changed in an action at law
between individuals."
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and 43

Vaught v. McClym:md 144 P.2d 612 (t·bnt 1945) citing 43 U.S.C.,\. Sections
751, 752 and various cases)
In
ascertaining
the
lines
of
land
or
in
re-establishing the lines of a survey, the footsteps
of the original surveyor, so far as discoverable on
the ground, should be followed and it is i.rnrrB.terial
i f the lines actually run by the original surveyor
are inco=ect. Ayers v. Watson, 137 U.S. 584, ll
S.Ct. 201, 34 L.Ed. 803; Galt V. 1.Jillingharn, ll F.2d
757.
In surveying a tract of land according to a former
plat or survey, the surveyor's only duty is to
relocate, upon the best evidence obtainable, the
courses and lines at the same place where originally
located by the first surveyor on the ground.
In
making the resurvey, he has the right to use the
field notes of the original survey. The object of a
resurvey is to furnish proof of the location of the
lost lines or monuments, not to dispute the
co=ectness of or to control the original survey.
The ori inal survey in all cases must, whenever
ossi le,
be
retrace ,
smce
it
cannot
e
disre arded or needlessly altere
a ter property
ri hts have een acquired in re iance upon it. On a
resurvey to es tab ish
ost
oun
ies, if the
original corners can be found, the places where they
were originally established are conclusive without
regard to whether they were in fact co=ectly
located. 8 Arn.Jur. Boundaries, Section 102, p. 319.
The Idaho Supreme Court in adopting the rule that the Manual
Instructions

for

the

Survey

of

States-1973 is law (Hook v. Horner,

the

Public

Lmds

of

the

or

United

517 P.2d 554 (Idaho 1973) and

Palmer v. Fitzpatrick, 557 P.2d 203 (Idaho 1976) further stated that any
survey not based thereon is not substantive evidence.

Hook v. Hon1er,

517 P.2d 554, 558 (Idaho 1973) held:
(W)e agree with respondents' contention that without
the field notes of the Ashley survey, or other
evidence indicating that the survey was conducted in
accordance with the United States ~lanual of
Surveying Instructions ... it cannot be achnitted as
substantive evidence ...
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In

the present case,

testiroony

or

methods

on

Respondents'

experts

the

of

Manual

do

not

Surveying

base

their

InstnJCtions.

Respondents' Brief has completely ignored the importance of the law in
this matter,

and has

not

specifically cited any fact

in dispute,

preferring to establish the corner on the basis of alleged stipulations,
waivers, and the detennination of law by a jury.
In O:Jrnia v. Putnam, 489 P. 2d 1001 (Utah 1971), the Utah Supreme
Court ruled as illegal a surveying tedmique used by Mr. Irwin Moser
who,

interestingly

T.V. II,p.103.1.16-18).

was

Respondents'

surveyor's

instnJCtor

(see

Moser's theory was stated as follows:

(I)f you have one or more in-place original
m:muments located anywhere in the township and you
have the angles and distances fr= the original
field notes, the exact location of a disputed line
can be determined, even though it is necessary to
cross over lost or obliterated corners."
In

the

instant case,

Bott

(fuser' s

student) ,

used

a

similar

technique to arrive at what Respondents claim is the Northeast corner of
Lot 12, Block 34.

Bott began at the =disputed Southeast corner of Lot

12, Block 34 and, using the scaled distances he assumed and derived fr=
the Martineau plat, measured up to what he considered the Northeast
corner of Lot 12.

Such is not the procedure for reestablishing an

obliterated corner or relocating a
"lanual.

lost corner as set forth in the

Bott admitted he was only "somewhat familiar" with the history

of platting of properties in Cache Co=ty (T.V.II,p.140,1.14-17)
based his knowledge of

the

law on Black's law Dictionary_,
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and

(T. V. II

p.106,1.7-13).

It is interesting to note that &ltt erred bv 33 feet in

this case just as his instructor, cfoser, en·ed b•; 33 feet in Cc1n1L:.i

Putnam.
The reason for &ltt 's sur;ey being against survey

law Jnd not

me.rely a "difference of opinion" as Resp:mdents claim in their Brief at
page

17

is

easily

seen by applying

Bott' s method of

measurement from a different beginning point.

By law,

corner should be locatable fran any direction
doubt).

(beyond

scaling

and

the recovered
a

reasonable

As the basis for re-establishing a disputed corner, there is no

justification for measuring in a single line from one known con1er, any
rrore than for measuring in a single line either east-west or north south
from any of the other known corners.

Thus, there is no basis for Bott's

preferring his measurement from the Southeast Corner of Lot 12 over a
measurement using his method from the Northeast

·vti.en Bott' s method of scaling and measuring is used begiJming

However
at the

Corner of Block ) .

;~ortheast

Corner of Lot 17, Block 8, neither the Southeast Con1er

of Lot 1, Block 8 nor the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34 can be
recovered.
doubt

as

The Southeast Corner of Lot l, Block 8 is just as much in
the

Northeast

scale-and-measure method.

Corner of Lot

12,

Block

34,

using

Bott' s

Therefore, even though the Southeast corner

of Lot 1, Block 8 is just across the gravel lane from the :'ortheast
Corner of Lot 12, Block 34, the former cannot be used to establish the
latter.

L<either point is useful in support of Bott' s contentions that

there was ever a 66-foot road established at the gravel lane.

Likewise

700 South Street, used as a point of reference by Bott, is a recent
addition to Block 8 and was not even anticipated by the
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~1artiJ1eau

Survev

or dl1y plats based thereon.

It is therefore not evidence in support of

the original survey and cannot be used to locate the "1ortheast Corner of
!.Dt 12.

Appellants' surveyor used the "1ortheast corner of Lot 17, Block

8 (an illldisputed, known corner) as a reference point together with the

Southeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34 (also known and illldisputed) to
detennine the location of the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34.
The plats introduced by both Appellants and Respondents at trial
were admitted only for the purpose of showing relative sizes and shapes
of properties in the area, not to detennine actual dimensions as they
exist on the groillld, not to detennine that a 66-foot road was ever
established by an original survey, not to detennine the location of the
disputed corner.
~

They are not official maps or plats of the original

withiJ1 the meaning of Section 57-5-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953

as amended)

(T.V.II,p.64,1.18-p.65,l.l, also T.V.III,p.43,1.7-10) nor

are they probative evidence according to the Manual in light of the
evidence that exists on the groillld, including lines of possession, and
record titles.

In short, they are just drawings.

Thus the Bott survey is not probative to detennine the location of
an obliterated corner.
His method is not equivalent to using proportional measurement to
detennine a lost corner either, and therefore has no substantive value
in detennining the disputed corner
Reid

V.

(see Cornia v. Putnam, supra. citing

Dunn, 201 Cal.App.2d 612, 20 Cal.Rptr. 273, 277-278 (1962)).

Argument 2.

The Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34 is either an

obliterated or a lost corner.

Any party desiring to establish it at a

particular point has the burden of proving the location beyond a
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reasonable doubt.
beyond a

In the event that no one can establish the corner

reasonable

doubt,

it must

be

relocated

bv

proportionate

measurement according to the !'13.nual of Instructions for the Survey of
the

Public

!..ands

of

the

United

States-1973,

supra.

It

is

not

acceptable, for example, to use the single scale-and-measure method used
in

the

Bott

survey.

The

Washington

Supreme

Court

discusses

the

development of Beyond A Reasonable ]):)ubt as the standard of proof in the
case of a disputed corner in San Juan County v.

Ayer, 604 P. 2d 1304

(Wash.App. , 1980) citing the !'13.nual of Instructions for the Survey of
the Public !..ands of the United States-1973,

Sections 5-9 at p.130 (1973

!'13.nual) :
Both parties rely upon the !'13.nual and are in
agreement that Washington courts and surveyors are
required to follow the instructions of the !'13.nual.
King v. Cannichael, 45 Wash. 127, 87 P. 1120 (1906).
The
(Washington)
court
first
considered
the
dichotomy between a lost , as opposed to an
obliterated, corner in King v. Cannichael, 45 Wash.
127, 87 P. 1120 (1906) at 1121, and upheld the trial
court's determination that the corner was lost
without suggesting what the burden of proof must be;
the court indicated that the case ''presented a
question of fact only" and that "we are not inclined
to disturb the findings of the trial court." The
lost corner vis-a-vis obliterated corner issue
appeared agail1 in Inrron v. Pearson, 47 Wash. 402, 92
P. 279 (1907), and then again in Hale v. Ball, 70
Wash. 435, 441, 126 P. 942, 944 (1912) , Where the
(Washington) court surrrnarized the applicable rules:
"We conceive that there is a distinction between a
lost corner and a corner the markings of which have
been obliterated.
If no monument or marking of a
quarter corner can be found or the testimony of its
location be overcorre by better evidence , a court
will decree the establishnent of a corner under the
rule prevailing in the land deparonent of the United
States;
that is, at a point equidistant from the
section corners.
But it does not follow that, if
there be evidence of a corner which has been
13

destroyed or obliterated by the lapse of time, a
court will direct the establishment of a corner
under the rule stated, or any other rule, for the
law establishes an obliterated corner where the
surveyor actually located it, and not Where it ought
to be located by a correct survey. 11
The

standard

preponderance

of

of
the

proof

then

evidence,"

evolved
to

"clear,

in

Washington

cogent

and

from

"a

convincing

evidence," and then to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard clearly
set forth in the language of the Manual.
The rationale for requiring proof 'beyond a
reasonable doubt" has been well stated in Greer v.
Squire, 9 Wash. 359, 364, 3 7 P. 545 (1894) . There
are strong policy considerations favoring the
retention of a corner once marked on the ground by
the government surveyor even though that is a point
which other surveyors might upon resurveys agree is
in error.
The directive of the Manual reflects
experiences accumulated over the years by those who
surveyed
the
continental
United
States
and
anticipated the problems of ascertaining obliterated
corners.
Their considered judgrrent that the
establishment of an "obliterated corner" shoUld
require the highest degree of proof reflects an
acknowledgen-ent that error was bound to be made by
surveyors subject to human frailties. 'lhus the GI.D
prefers the reestalbis&nent of a lost corner by the
proportionate method rather than reliance upon
evidence of its original location that is open to
doubt.
To lend certainty to an area that might
otherwise lead to "great confusion and litigation,"
the Manual remes proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of the original ocation of the point.
We hold that a art see
to recover the location
o an o literated surveying point must sustain t e
burden of1'.ro1al the location of that point beyond
a reaosnab e ou t.
The policy basis set forth above is compatible with that set forth
in Cragin v. Powell, 128 U.S.

691, 9 S.Ct. 203, 32 L.Ed. 566 (1888)

cited in Greer v. Squire, 9 Wash.359, 364, 37 P. 545 (1894) as follows:
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The power to make and correct surveys of the public
land belongs to the political department of the
goveniment; "and the reason of this rule," says the
court, quoting ... Haydel v. Dufresne, 17 How.23, (30,
15 L.Ed. 115 (1854)) "is that great confusion and
liti ation would ensue ~the judicial tribwials,
state an
ederal, were pennitte to inter ere .:md
overthrow the public surve s on no other grow1d than
an opunoll t t t ey coun
ave t e It.Dr ill t e
field better done, and divisions more equitably
made, than the department of public lands cound do.''
Thus (the Washington) court early declared that "the
true corner is where the United States Surveyor
established it, notwithstanding its location may not
be such as is designated in the plat or field notes.
The Washington court in San Juan v. Ayer,

supra. citing State v.

Green, 91 Wash.2d 431, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979), reconsideration granted, 92
Hash. 2d 1103

(1979) discussed the standard of appelo.te review and

concluded by holding that:
Despite the seemingly higher standard adopted by the
court in "Se o" for appellate review of clear,
cogent an conVlilcing evi ence, t e stanaaid for
review of beyond a reasonable doubt evidence re:nains
the "substantial evidence test."
The Utah Supreme Court has since 1937 (see Henrie v. Hyer, 70 P.2d

154, 156 (Utah 1937)) recognized that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
required to establish an obliterated corner.
It

was

prejudicial

error

in

this

case

not

to

require

the

Respondents to prove the location of the obliterated corner beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Argument 3.
jury.
to

It was also prejudicial error to sul:mit this case to a

There are no material questions of fact which need to be resolvecl

detennine

the location of the disputed corner

(in spite of the

general allegations of Respondents' counsel in their Brief).
and Respondents essentially agree on the facts.

20

/\ppellants

Bott' s measuranents to

known points are not in dispute.

In fact,

all survey rneasurEIDents

presented were in agreement to within a few feet.

Other pertinent facts

such as the nature and location of old fences, etc. , are not in dispute
(see

Surrrnary of

Facts

above).

\.Jhat

is

in dispute are

the

legal

implications of the facts and Bott' s application of the facts to unknown
poli1ts.
of

The application of the facts to determine a point is a rratter

carefully

supra.)

developed

law

(see Manual of Surveying

Instructions,

Thus Appellants contest the Respondents' application of law to

the facts of this case, not the facts thEIDsel ves.

(See also Sections

78-21-1 and 3 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), Holland v. Wilson,
327 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1958), and Appellants' Brief pp. 21-22.)
Argurrent 4.

The Supreme Court may reverse the verdict in this

matter or grant a new trial on the basis of the verdict not belilg
supported by substantial evidence and because substantial, prejudicial
errors were comnitted at trial, including:
a.

Sul:xnitting this matter of law to a jury.

b.

Failure to require Respondents to prove their case beyond
a reasonable doubt.

c.

Faillilg to propertly instruct the jury (see Appellants'
Brief, pp.23-26)

d.

Faillilg to grant judgp!ent notwithstanding the verdict or
in the alternative a new trial.

State v. Day, 572 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1977),
This Court
instruction
the failure
miscarriage

will notice the failure to give an
even though it was not requested when
to give it would plainly result in a
of justice.
21

State v. Evans, No. 18482 Utah State Bulletin, August 15, 1983,
We recognize that, had the instructions which were
given been erroneous to such an extent that they
prevented a fair determination of the issues or
resulted in a miscarriage of justice, we are at
liberty to notice the error irrespective of
counsel's failure to preserve it.'' Citations
omitted.
Anderson v. Toone, No. 17924 Utah State Bulletin, October 15, 1983
citing Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982),
The trial court has wide discretion to grant or deny
a irotmo for a new trial and we do not reverse a
denial unless the 'evidence to support the verdict
was completely lacking or was so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly
imreasonable and unjust. ' (citations omitted).
Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Square D. Company, No. 17546 Utah
State Bulletin, September 15, 1983 citing Williams v. Lloyd, 16
Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d 166, 167 (1965),
This Court has occasionally exercised its discretion
in the absence of proper objections and reviewed
instructions given or not given. But we have said
that this should be done 'only under ur.usual
circumstances where the interests of justice
urgently so demand. '
Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980)
citing Nelson v. Watts, 563 P.2d 798, 799 (Utah 1977),
In viewing this evidence, this Court will upset the

jury verdict only upon a showing by the appealing

party that the evidence so clearly preponderates in
his favor reasonable people could not differ on the
outcome of the case. Also, in determining if there
was sufficient evidence to support the jury's
verdict this Court will consider those facts which
ID'.lSt strongly support the verdict and where there is
any conflict in the evidence this Court will
consider as true that evidence which supports the
verdict.
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State v. Pierce, 655 p.2d 677 (Utah 1982),
This can be done (entertain an issue for the first
time on appeal) in rare cases under Rule 4 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence, or under such exceptions as
this Court considers of momentous concern in
protecting constitutional rights previously waived.
(citations omitted.)
State v. Lesley,

~o.

18038 Utah State Bulletin, O::tober 1, 1983, citing

Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
This Court has discretion to review the allegedly
erroneous admission of evidence when the grounds of
objection are not clearly or correctly stated.
Argument 5.
Court to

stand

To permit the judgment and decision of the District
in light of substantial,

prejudicial error,

denies

Appellants equal protection of the law, guaranteed pursuant to Article
I, Section 2 of the Constitution of Utah, and Amendment XDJ, Section 1,
of the Constitution of the United States.
right

to

due

process

provided

in

It also violates Appellants'

Article

I,

Section

7 of

the

Constitution of Utah and Amendment XDJ, Section 1 of the Constitution of
the United States.
Furtherirore, the decision impacts on others, not parties to this
action so as to deny them equal protection of the
pursuant

to Article I,

law,

guaranteed

Section 2 of the Constitution of Utah,

and

Amendment XDJ, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States and
violates their right to due process provided in Article I, Section 7 of
the

Constitution

of

Utah

and

Amendrrent

XDJ,

Section

1

of

the

Constitution of the United States.
To deprive Appellants of the right to rely on a survey corners set
by law beyond a reasonable doubt,

is to selectively apply the law in

violation of Appellants' right to equal protection.
23

To establish an

obliterated

or

lost

corner

except

as

provideJ

bv

Ln-1

\'-;:,, Lltl':,

Appellants' right to due process.
To permit a j udg,nent or decision to impact on the propertv ri c;hts
of others not

parties

to

the

dispute

to

w1settle

their

propert·:

descriptions, denies them equal protection and due process as well.
Appellants now reply to the Respondents' Brief point by point.
Point L
\.Jhether

(see Respondents' Brief (RB) p. 1,
Respondents

or Appellants

have

I~ature

title

of the Case)

to

the

disputeJ

property depends on the location of the beginning points in their deeJs
as intended by the deed writers, not merely as originally surveyed.
Contrary to Respondents'

assertion that "the parties waived all

other claims," Appellants never stipulated to refrain from reformin.2
their deeds, to give Respondents more land than their pleadings called
for, or to give up any other rights of possession in the event
"original"

;~ortheast

JJ1

Corner of Lot 12 were located at some point other

than the one presently relied upon.
Point 2.
With

(see RB p.2 paragraph 1, Statement of Facts)

regard

to

Respondents'

assertion

that

Appellants

began

claiming land north of a fence existing in 1969 shortly after Appellants
acquired their land; there was no fence on roughly the west half of the
property (T.V.I, p.35,1.11-13, T.V.II, p.76, 1.2-9 see Appellants' Brief
p. 28, note 7) .

Respondents extended the partwl angular fence to the

west boundary line in about 1977.

It has been taken Jown, re-angled and

disputed ever since.
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In any event, such fact,

even if true.

is not supportive of the

Respondents' claim for the location of the :iortheast Corner of Lot 12,
Block 34 as originally surveyed.
Point 3.

(see RB p. 2 paragraph 2, Statement of Facts)

Respondents'

statement,

northeast corner of Lot 12,
Plaintiffs claim."

is false.

"It

was

discovered

that

the

original

Block 34 ... was 33 feet south of where
No evidence was presenr:ed at trial in

suppcrt of such a staterrent nor would such evidence been probative to
locate the disputed corner.

Respcndents' statement should alert the

Court that Respondents , not Appellants, devised the idea to =ve the
corner, which even they believed

until shorly before trial, was at the

location claimed by Appellants.
Point 4.

(see RB p. 2 last sentence, Statement of Facts)

Regarding Respondents' claim that they are now entitled to land
south of the existing fence (land never before in dispute) ; Respondents
acquire no title to any property by virtue of this action nor are they
entitled to a rerredy which they have not pled and for which Appellants
have had no notice.

(see Washington

:~ickel

Mining & Alloys,

Inc.

v.

M3.rtin, supra. )
Point 5.
Holland v.

(see RB p. 3 paragraph 2, Statement of Facts)
Wilson,

327 P. 2d 250,

252 (Utah 1958) set forth the

standard that a jury trial was appropriate only to decide questions of
fact.

Even if the District Court did not understand prior to trial that

there were no factual issues in this matter requiring jury resolution,
the O::lurt should still have granted Appellants'
:'otwithstanding the Verdict or for a [~ew Trial.
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Motion for Judgment
To permit a jury to

decide the law is to require of them the expertise of , j •1c:ge
itself contrary to law.

n 1d

In short, even though the j ur:; did i L:; best

1

s

1,

1

determine "a preponderance of the evidence", i Ls verdict c"ould net have
been anything but arbitrary.
Appellants respectfully sul::mit that

the verdict in this :ruLter,

if allowed to stand, establishes "stipulation". ''jur:: determination ,,f
law", and the standard of "preponderance of the illusory evidence" as
legal methods for relocating obliterated or lost corners.
Point 6.

(see RB pp.3-5, Right to Jury Trial)

Respondents' assertion that they are entitled to a j ur:; trial i

.~

only valid to the extent that there are factual questions to be decided.
Appellants objected to a trial by jury because the issues to be resolved
were legal, and because there were no essential facts in dispute.
In spite of Respondents' claims that the location of the disputed
comer was

a

question of fact,

;iortheast Corner of wt 12,
fact.

the definition and

location of the

Block 34 can be matters both of law and

But the facts material to the location of the corner are not in

dispute (see Argument 1 above).

There is no substantial, probative, or

lawful evidence which supports the Resp.1ndents'

position and it 1vas

prejudicial error to refer the matter to a jury for determination.
Point 7.

(see RB p.5. Right to Jury Trial)

Respondents'

staterrEnt,

"At trial Plaintiffs contended that

the

original ,lortheast Con1er had moved and changed from where it had been
placed,"

is

false.

Appellants

Appellants maintained that the

made

:~ortheast

no

such

statement

Rather.

Con1er of IJ1t L.'. Bl,1ck l'+ :s

.md al·.,,1T1s has ':Jeen at what

is presently called the "Lrrsen Fence

l):in1er."
Resprmdents

contend

that

the

original

northeast

corner ... "was

located •..Jhere the plats, surveys, deeds and other records indicated it
WDuld be, i.e. 1320 feet directly north of the southeast corner of 1.Dt
12, Block 34 ... '' The deeds, plats,

lawful surveys and other records

indicate plainly on their face that
a.

the northeast corner of 1.Dt 12, Block 34 is approximately

1350 feet north of the southeast corner of 1.Dt 12, Block 34.
b.

the S01.ltheast corner of 1.Dt 1, Block 8 is approximately

1350 south of the northeast corner of 1.Dt 17, Block 8
c.

there is a 33-foot road separating then.

d.

Respondents' assumptions regarding a "standard" 1320 foot

Block, the existence of a 66-foot road, and the location of the south
line and southeast corner of Block 8 are completely unfounded.
(Respondents actually derive their measurenents from the scale of a
plat, as previously discussed,

in spite of all other deeds and other

records, and not from deeds, official plats or official surveys as they
claim.)
Point 8.
In

spite

(see RB p. 5ff, ARGl.MENTS II and III)
of

Respondents'

general

assertions,

substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict

or

there
the

is

no

District

Court's decision, and there has been substantial and prejudicial error
Lorrmitted at trial.

(See Arguments above).
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(see RB p. S, paragraph 1. Evidence in Supp_•rL of Jue ..

Point 9.
Verdict)

Respondents'

list of "evidence" in support cJf the j ur:1' s •;erdi cl

contains nothing material or substantial that supp<Jrts their c L1im fc_or
locating the disputed corner in a manner prescribed by law as set forth
in the i'lanual of Surveying Instructions - 1973. (see Arguments above) .
Point 10.

(see RB p. S, last paragraph, Evidence in Support of Jurv

Verdict)
Appellants'

do not object to Respondents'

sul:mitted by Appellants at trial.

right to use evidence

Appellants do object however to the

unlawful interpretation of the evidence beyond the purposes for which it
was admitted, specifically in regard to the >artineau Plat, Exhibit "'l.
It is not proper and lawful survey practice to conclude from a scaled
measurement of an Lmofficial plat the exact '.Tleasurements of a
especially in light of roore conclusive evidence.
a valuable and useful docurrent.

L.Jt,

The >Jartineau Plat is

But there was no evidence that it •.vas

established on the grotmd or approved as an official plat.

:Jo :=ielJ

notes of a corresponding survey were found, and it gave no calls for the
dimensions of Lot 12.

It was drawn to scale, thus showing approxilrate

anticipated dimensions and relationships between various properties.
Respondents'
probative

value

confuse
as

long-standing

lines

record titles

take

detennining

the

the

admissibility

established

by

law,

of
e.g.

evidence
that

with

its

evidence

or

of possession on the grotmd which conform with
precedence

foot-steps

over

tax

plats

aml

measurements

of the original sur.:e·1or.
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(see Diehl

i1:

Z:mger, 39 Xich 601 (1878) and also Brown, Evidence and Procedures for
i'Dunclar1 Location, cited in Appellants' Brief at pp.17-19).
111ough Respondents

claim

the priority and relative weight of

evidence is the sole province of the jury, the cases cited refer to fact
questions and not issues of law.
11 C.J.S. Boundaries, Section 118, p. 728.
TI1e relative weight to be given evidence of disputed
bcundaries such as natural monuments, artificial
marks , courses and distances, and the like, is
ordinarily a question of law.
Point 11.

(see RB pp.8-9, Evidence in Support of Jury Verdict)

With regard to Respondents' claimed measurements, Appellants do not
dispute

the

ability of

Bott

to measure

distances

in the

field.

Appellants do, however, dispute the purported legal conclusions of his
survey.
Respondents have the burden of establishing the disputed corner
beyond

a

reasonable

doubt

in

spite

of

what

Appellants

prove.

Respondents' claims cannot be established by default.
Point 12.

(see RB pp. 9-13, Evidence in Support of Jury Verdict)

The Eden Akers subdivision (Exhibit 24) referred to as Respondents'
evidence

is relatively recent

(1961),

is not in Lot 12,

and its

dimensions are irrelevant to a determination of the disputed corner.
None of the other plats sul:mitted by Respondents purport to be
surveys or official survey placs and are merely
relationships between the properties.
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to

show general

Point 13.

(see RB p.10.

line 9ff, Evidence in Support of .Jur:1

Verdict)
Respondents claim to know the location of the north side
South Street.

<Jf

801)

However. the position of the north side of 800 South

Street is unknown. given the 66-foot right-of-way asserted bv the Bott
survey.

The road is actually only 33 feet wide.

cannot use

Thus Respondents

the position of the north side of 800 South Street to

determine the south side of the road.

If the original surveyor actually

intended and established a 33-foot wide road, as presently exists. and
not the 66-foot road Respondents claim. all other points relied upon in
Lot 12 match with measurements called for in the deeds. not the Bott
survey.
(see RB p.11. Evidence in Support of Jury Verdict)

Point 14.

In trying to prove that Lot 12 is 1320 feet long. Respondents rel:•

on non-legal and non-probative evidence (illusory evidence) which even
if accepted

in the

inconclusive.

light most

favorable

to

Respondents'

case

is

Respondents ignore conclusive proof that it is longer.

Some of the evidence ignored is briefly outlined here.

(a) The aerial photograph (Exhibit 3) and measurements in the field
(including Respondents' own measurements if interpreted properly)

show

excess land in the ground covered by the Martineau Plat (see map in
Appellants' Brief).
Appellants I

This is not by any means an unusual situation (see

Brief p. 15 and o'<Cornia v.

Putnam.

489 p. 2d 1001

(Utah

1971)).
(b)

The

Kreisie

to

Kreisie

deed

of

1943

(see

Exhibit

transfered the north part of Lot 12 as a parcel e.xactly 660 feet
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l~)

(10

chains)

long,

and the entire south part as a parcel to include the

remaining distance, (referred to as

12..:l chains

more or less).

Thus the

"north part" is not equal to the "south part" and the excess present
alw-ays remained in the "south part" of lDt 12.
1.Dt

12

is

longer

than

the 2 x

Thus also, the length of

660 feet or 1320 feet claimed by

Respondents and Respondents' method is proven conclusively to be in
error

and

non-probative.

The

M.D.

Hanm:md to Mattie Hansen deed

(Exhibit 39?) agrees with Appellants' evidence and the Kreisie deeds
above-mentioned.
(c)

Hickman's

testim:my

regarding

the

"standard

historical

distance of lots", is irrelevant, misleading and unfounded because the
size of lots in the actual area of interest is clear from \IDcontested
survey measurements and the aerial photo presented in the trial.

The

length of Block 8 and lDt 12 are each considerably greater than 2 x 1320
feet implied by Mr.

Bott

(see appellants brief map, pp.27, 28.) Thus

there is excess land over that suggested by scaling from the Martineau
Survey.

Inclusions of this excess land obviously makes the length of

l.Dt 12 greater than "a standard 1320 feet".

Neasure:nents involving 700

South street are irrelevant because this street is not called for in the
!'13.rtineau Plat.

If the present 33-foot gravel lane at 800 South lane

were to be widened to 66 feet, best evidence indicates that the extra 33
feet might better come from the north side of the present lane rather
than from the south side.

Thus the southeast corner of 1.Dt 1, Block 8

would be located 33 feet north of where Bott assumes it to be.
however,

that

there

is

evidence

actually laid out in the filed.

that

a

66-foot

Recall,

roadway was never

The roadway ends altogether to the west
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and to the east, and a setback of ten feet '-'11 edch side nf the prcse11t
33 feet

lane was

subdivisions.

called

for

d

few

vears

back

in

Ct11tic:ipdtiu11

, ,f

The 33 foot lane is equitdbb locdted, and is consistent

with deed calls in l..Dt 12.
(d)

Respondents argue that the deed from '.-!. D. Hamrond to >lattie

Hansen in 1877 indicates that l.Dt 12,

Block 34 was 1320 feet

long.

Actually, their assumption that the "north part of Int 12" was the same
length as the

south part

of 1.Dt

Plaintiffs' exhibit number 12.

12

is

in

error

as

indicated

in the deed of Kreasie to Kreasie

by
the

"North part of l.Dt 12" is described as being "40 rods" (10 chains) long.
The "South part of lDt 12" however, is described as extending from its
south boundary "10. 2 chains South from the '.\lortheast corner of said
lot".

Thus this e.xhibit illustrates two points, viz. (1) lDt 12, Block

34 was considerably longer than 1320 feet in the 1943 era dnd earlier,
and (2) the excess land was in the "South part".
eventually deeded to Hansen.
basis in fact.
Respondents'

The deeds,

case

are

clear

'This "South part" was

Thus the Respondents'

argurent has no

even in the light TOCJst favorable to the
on

their

face,

despite

Respondents'

assertions to the contrary.
Point 15.

(see RB p .12 last paragraph, Evidence in Support of Jill''.'

Verdict)
Appellants do not object to the admission of the Martineau Plat as
evidence, nor to its proper use, that is, to show relationships between
properties not actual dimensions from its scale.

The >Jartineau Plat was

never offered by Plaintiffs as an Official clap or Offici31 Plat of m
actual survey.

Indeed the >Tattie Hansen Deed dated Januar:1 12,
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187~

used the designation "wt 12" three years prior to the Martineau Plat of
1'380.

The

oft-referred-to

surveyors admit,

Plat

is

just

as

Respondents

merely a drawi.ng which purports to be based on the

>Iartineau Survey.
or that

>la.rti.neau

It neither indicates when said survey was performed
actually ma.de the drawing.

~la.rtinea.u

The Respondents' claim that other plats in evidence are "ancient
documents"

is wholly without merit.

;'lone of the plats sutmitted by

Respondents as evidence qualify as ancient documents for purposes of
this case.
plats.
age

Some are not relevant.

Some are not verified.

Some are tax

Age is not the sole determina..nt of an ancient document nor does

alone

endow

materiality.

an

prior

document

·Ni.th relevance

or

Such documents must still be interpreted on their face, in

light of all other evidence.
Appellants'

irrelevant

Respondents' documentary evidence supports

position when viewed within the frame=rk of

the other

undisputed facts.
Point 16.

(see RB bottom half of p.

13, Verdict Effects Only

Parties to Tri.al)
Despite Respondents'
allowed to stand,

assertions,

the results of this trial,

if

do affect the accepted position of the Northeast

C.Orner of Lot 12, Block 34 for landowners in l.ot 12 not parties to this
action.

The C.Ourt has established an obliterated or lost corner at a

location not previously relied on.

The location therefore impacts on

the validity of all deeds which use this point of reference.
Furthenrore, if those deeds are subject to reformation,

as the

Respondents claim, then the Appellants' and Respondents' deeds are also
subject to that same reformation and Appellants are still entitled to
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the disputed property.

Appellants did not stipulate avrav their right to

deed reforTTl3.tion in such a case.

Thus the lower court decision does not

reoldve the boundary dispute.
Point 17.

(see RB pp. 14-15, Appellant's Failure to Object)

Appellants objected to the granting of a jury trial , to the jury
inst=tions used and moved for judgrrent notwithstanding the verdict.
As

to the jury instnJCtions, there is no question that there was no

court reporter in the in-chambers discussions and

that

counsel

for

Appellants failed to enter the objections to the jury instnJCtions in
the record during

the jury deliverations.

renedy the problem by amending the record.

Appellants

attempted

to

The jury instnJCtions set

forth in Appellants' Brief are verbatim from the proposed instructions
and the given instructions copies of which were at the time of trial
given to all parties and the originals of which Appellants' believe have
been transmitted to the Suprerre Court for review.
The District Court might well have rendered the matter of the jury
instructions

moot

by

reviewing

the

evidence

and granting

notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Appellants'

judgment

~btion.

Even if Appellants had made no effort to amend the record there has
still been substantial prejudicial error

corrrnitted which rmre

than

permits this Court to intervene (see Arguments above.)
~oint

18.

(see RB p.16, Conclusions)

Appellants' conclusions differ in essential ways from those of the
Respondents.

34

d.

Appelld11ts have clearlv shown substantial and prejudicial error

in the proceedings, that the verdict is not supported by substantial
eviJence, and that the verdict is against law (see Arguments above).
b.

The Respondents'

statement "the essence of the

Plaintiffs'

cippeal is a challenge of the facts not the law." is absolutely wrong.
The appellants do not challenge the facts, only the way the Respondents
attempt to use them.

The proper use of the facts is clearly stated in

surJey law dS given in the Manual of Instructions for the Survey of the
Public Lands of the United States - 1973.
and the location of known,

real

objects

Measurements of distances,
like

fences

and

lines

of

possession,

are essentially known and agreed to by all parties and

surveyors.

These are the facts.

How these facts are to be used to

detennine the intent of the original surveyor (follow the steps of the
original surveyor) in the restoration of the Northeast Corner of Lot 12,
Block 34 is a matter of law, carefully spelled out, whether the corner
be obliterated or lost.
c.

It is not a subject for jury detennination.

The Appellants have no objection to the Defendants' use of

evidence the Appellants introduced.

Appellants welcane clarificaitons

from either side.
d.

Respondents'

evidence,

including

the

Bott

Survey,

clearly

indicates that all parties acknowledge the intent of the deed writers to
begin the property descriptions at the point claimed by Appellants as
the .-:ortheast Comer of Lot 12, Block 34 and oft referred to as the
Larsen Fence Comer.
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e.
evidence.

The jury should be corrmended for their efforts to weigh the
It is unfortunate that they were asked to decide questions of

law.

36

cmcwsrms
Appellants have dem::mstrated that the j udgrrent of the District
Omrt is clearly against
evidence.

law and is not supported by substantial

Appellants have also indicated that substantial, prejudicial

errors were corrrnitted at trial.
The evidence now before the Court is sufficient beyond a reasonable
doubt to establish the Northeast Corner of l.Dt 12, Block 34, Providence
Survey of Farms at the location claimed by Appellants at the point oft
referred to at trial as the lBrsen Fence Corner.
Whether the location is for the purpose of detennining the intent
of the deed writers--comn:m grantors of the parties--or to determine the
"footsteps" and intent of the original surveyor, the point is the same.
Only Appellants' surveys comply with the legal requirements set
forth in the Manual of Instructions for the Survey of the Public IBnds
of the United States - 1973 for the re-establishnent of obliterated
corners.

Furthenmre, if, after reviewing the evidence,

this Court

feels that neither party has established the disputed corner beyond a
reasonable doubt, Appellants' surveys have already met the requirements
for the lawful restoration of a lost corner.

Both methods indicate the

true location of the Northeast Corner of l.Dt 12, Block 34, Providence
Farm Survey to be as Appellants claim.
Appellants respectfully request that the Judgflleilt of the District
Court be reversed and that Judgflleilt be entered in their favor, or in the
alternative, that a New Trial be granted.
DATED this 25th day of April, 1984.
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